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"In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved ... ." 1
The wording of the seventh amendment suggests that deter-
mining whether the Constitution guarantees a right to jury trial in a
particular case requires an historical inquiry. No new rights were con-
ferred thereby; existing rights were "preserved" and given constitu-
tional protection. Hence, it is inviting to infer that right to jury trial
today depends solely upon whether jury trial was accorded a party,
as a matter of right, in like cases in 1791.'
Such an inquiry is no mean task. It involves a study of the
distribution of jurisdiction among then existing courts of law, equity
and admiralty, because, in 1791, jury trial as of right was con-
fined to actions at law,- although it did not extend to all such actions.'
Jurisdictional lines were primarily a matter of remedy, but to some
extent turned on other factors such as subject matter and differences
t Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A. 1950, LL.B. 1953, Vanderbilt
University. Member, Iowa and Virginia Bars.
I U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
2 This is the date that ratification of the first ten amendments was completed and
would be the relevant date for a purely historical test of the right in the federal courts.
8 Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253, 262 (1856) (equity); Waring v.
Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 459, 460'(1847) (admiralty).
4 E.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966) (civil contempt) ; McEI-
rath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880) (suits against the United States); 5 J.
MooRy, FEDEAL PAcricE f 38.32[1] . (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as MooRE]
(condemnation actions under the power of eminent domain).
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in procedure." Further complications stem from historical shifts and
overlapping jurisdiction.' Moreover, the careful historian encounters
difficulty in applying the fruits of his study to contemporary civil
litigation involving subject matter and procedural patterns unused, and
sometimes unknown, in 1791.
7
New procedural patterns in contemporary civil litigation do more
that just complicate the application of 1791 results in right to jury
trial disputes. In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,8 the Supreme
Court clearly suggested that the dimension of the constitutional
right reflects changes engendered by procedural reform, i.e., that
because of changes in rules regulating the conduct of adjudication,
the results in right-to-jury-trial disputes may be different from
those dictated by history, at least where the contemporary result
broadens enjoyment of jury trial. If this is a sound reading of
Beacon, the case contains strong medicine. So measured, the right
is far from static; the merits of further reform must be considered
from a new aspect. In this article, I propose to examine critically the
premises of the Beacon decision and to explore briefly some of its
ramifications. Preliminarily, however, some elaboration of Beacon
itself and of its principal successors is necessary.
I. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover
Plaintiff Fox, a theater owner, had made contracts with film
distributors under which it was granted the exclusive right to show
first-run pictures in a particular geographic area. These contracts also
provided Fox with "clearances," periods during which no other theater
in the same competitive area could show the same film. Defendant
Beacon built a theater about eleven miles from plaintiff's and, accord-
ing to the complaint, notified Fox that it regarded the contracts barring
simultaneous showings of first-run films at the two theaters as a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. Threats of treble damage suits against plain-
tiff and its distributors were also alleged in the complaint.
Fox sought a declaratory judgment that these contracts did not
violate the antitrust laws. Plaintiff also requested an injunction to
prohibit Beacon from instituting any antitrust actions against Fox
or its distributors pending final disposition of the action. Beacon's
5 F. JA Es, CIVI. PROCEDURE § 82 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAMEs].
6Id.
7 Commentators have attributed to the merger of law and equity most of the
difficulties of determining right to jury trial today. See, e.g., 2B W. BARROx & A.
HoLTzoFF, FEDEmRL PRAcricE AN'D PROCEDURE § 872 (Wright ed. 1961) ; JAMES § 8.4.
5 MooRE 1 2.06.
8 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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answer denied such threats. Alleging that there was no substantial
competition between the theaters and that there was a conspiracy to
manipulate contracts and "clearances" so as to restrain trade and
monopolize first-run pictures, Beacon counterclaimed for treble damages
and demanded a jury trial of disputed factual issues. The plaintiff
moved to strike the demand for jury trial as to the complaint and
the answer thereto.
The district court granted this motion as well as a further motion
for separation of the issues raised by the complaint and answer from
those of the counterclaim. The court also ordered that the plaintiff's
claim be tried first without a jury. The Ninth Circuit denied man-
damus.9  It held that the complaint presented equitable issues
because, at the time of its filing, Fox was threatened with interference
with its property or contract rights and was without an adequate legal
remedy. Equitable jurisdiction thus having attached, it was immate-
rial that Fox might have acquired thereafter an adequate legal remedy
by way of defense against Beacon's counterclaim. The court also
ruled that, although the trial court was not required to try the nonjury
claim first, its decision to do so was a matter within its discretion.
The Supreme Court, although conceding that the complaint
validly sought equitable relief,"0 reversed. It held that the controversy
contained both legal and equitable elements with common factual
issues " and that, except under the most compelling circumstances, the
lower court could not deprive a litigant of his right to jury trial on
issues material to legal elements by ordering a sequence of trial which
first disposed of equitable elements.
Mr. justice Stewart, joined by Justices Harlan and Whittaker,
dissented. The dissent relied on a purely historical view of the right
to jury trial. With regard to the request for declaratory relief, it
insisted that the statutory declaratory remedy is neither legal nor
equitable and that the right to jury trial depends on "the basic context
in which the issues are presented." 2 If the issues are of a kind tradi-
tionally cognizable in equity, there is no right to jury trial; if of
a kind traditionally cognizable at common law, there is such a right.
Because an unsupported declaration of rights might not have protected
9 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1958).
10 The Court endorsed the Ninth Circuit's liberal construction of the complaint
as requesting an injunction against the threat of suit as well as against the institution
of such suits. 359 U.S. at 506.
"1The primary factual issue was whether there was substantial competition be-
tween the two theaters. The dissenting opinion raised some question as to whether
that issue was in reality material to both the claim and the counterclaim. Id. at 513.12 d. at 515, citing E. BoRcuARD, D.=AtrAToRy JUDGMENTS $99-404 (2d e4,
1941) and 5 MooRE 38.29,
19671
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Fox adequately, the case was equitable. That the counterclaim for
damages was legal was conceded, but traditionally it was within the
trial court's discretion to fix the sequence of trials of contemporaneous
actions in equity and at law.13
Consistent with the latter point, Professor Fleming James, Jr.,
has suggested in his excellent treatise that the Beacon decision could
have been based simply on a finding that the trial court abused its
discretion in fixing the sequence of adjudication. 4 Support for this
position may be found in the majority opinion of the Court which, in
acknowledging the possibility that prior adjudication of equitable ele-
ments with nonjury determination of common issues of fact may be
necessary, spoke in terms of discretion.' 5 So viewed, Beacon would
very nearly square with history, for equitable restraint of contem-
poraneous proceedings at law traditionally required the exercise of
discretion. Yet the terms of that exercise were somewhat different.
Historically, the determination was governed by such factors as the
condition of the docket and whether the complainant in equity had been
precipitate.'" In Beacon the adequacy of the legal remedy is con-
trolling. 7 Indeed the Court in Beacon seems more to be stating a rule
with an exception than describing the terms of discretion.
The rule of Beacon is that, in cases involving both legal and
equitable elements with a common factual issue, there is a constitutional
right to jury trial on the factual issue; departure from the rule is
18 359 U.S. at 517, citing American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937)
(suit in equity for cancellation and surrender of life policy on ground of fraud followed
by action at law for the proceeds of the policy).
14 JAMEs § 8.10.
15 359 U.S. at 515.
16The leading definition appears in American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S.
203, 215-16 (1937):
A court has control over its own docket.... In the exercise of a sound
discretion it may hold one lawsuit in abeyance to abide the outcome of an-
other, especially where the parties and the issues are the same. . . . If request
had been made by the respondents to suspend the suits in equity till the other
causes were disposed of, the District Court could have considered whether
justice would not be done by pursuing such a course, the remedy in equity
being exceptional and the outcome of necessity. . . . There would be many
circumstances to be weighed, as, for instance, the condition of the court calen-
dar, whether the insurer had been precipitate or its adversaries dilatory, as
well as other factors. In the end, benefit and hardship would have to be set
off, the one against the other, and a balance ascertained.
17 If there should be cases where the availability of declaratory judgment or
joinder in one suit of legal and equitable causes would not in all respects
protect the plaintiff seeking equitable relief from irreparable harm while
affording a jury trial in the legal cause, the trial court will necessarily have
to use its discretion in deciding whether the legal or equitable cause should
be tried first. Since the right to jury trial is a constitutional one, however,
while no similar requirement protects trial by the court, that discretion is very
narrowly limited and must, wherever possible, be exercised to preserve jury
trial.
359 U.S. at 510.
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authorized only when irreparable harm would result from jury deter-
mination of the issue. This is the interpretation adopted by most of
the lower courts." It represents a striking departure from history.19
Immediately, it rejects, for the purpose of determining right to jury
trial, equity's traditional power 20 to enjoin, pending adjudication in
equity, proceedings at law instituted by plaintiff's adversary.2' The
Court in Beacon specifically referred to bills of peace, quia timet and
injunctions.2 2  Professor James has suggested that interpleader and
rescission might be added to that list.2
But the rule implies more. Taken literally, it requires that equity
refuse to adjudicate an issue material to requested equitable relief,
if that issue is also material to requested legal relief. 24 For example,
fact issues, material both to the grant of an injunction and to the award
of damages in infringement cases, become triable to a jury as of right. 5
18 E.g., Florists Nationwide Telephone Delivery Network-America's Phone-
order Florists, Inc. v. Florists Telegraph Delivery Ass'n, 371 F.2d 263 (7th Cir.
1967) (injunction and damages); AMF Tuboscope, Inc. v. Cunningham, 352 F.2d
150 (10th Cir. 1965) (plaintiff sought injunction, accounting and treble damages;
defendant counterclaimed for declaratory relief and damages); Simmons v. Avisco,
Local 713, Textile Workers Union, 350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965) (restoration of
union membership and damages); Swofford v. B. & W., Inc., 336 F.2d 406 (5th
Cir. 1964) (plaintiff sought injunction, accounting and treble damages; defendant
counterclaimed for declaratory relief) ; Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing
Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1961) (plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief;
defendant counterclaimed for damages; this the the leading lower court decision);
Curry v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 271 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1959) (plaintiff sought damages;
defendant counterclaimed for cancellation and injunction) ; General Inv. Co. v. Acker-
man, 37 F.R.D. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (rescission and damages); Jennings v. McCall,
224 F. Supp. 919 (W.D. Mo. 1963) (accounting and damages); Harkobusic v. General
Am. Transp. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (damages and injunction);
Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Corp. v. Brodish, 200 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (plain-
tiff sought declaratory relief, cancellation and rescission; defendant counterclaimed
for damages); Inland Steel Prod. Co. v. MPH Mfg. Corp., 25 F. R. D. 238 (N.D.
Ill. 1959) (plaintiff sought declaratory relief and an injunction; defendant counter-
claimed for declaratory relief and damages) ; Shubin v. United States District Court,
313 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1963) (dictum) (plaintiff sought declaratory relief; defendant
counterclaimed where only an injunction was possible; jury trial was denied) ; United
States v. Rentz, 213 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. Iowa 1962) (dictum) (plaintiff sought
foreclosure; one defendant crossclaimed against another for rescission and damages).
19 Writing in 1959, I utterly failed to see the significance of Beacon and advocated
an historical test which gave greater recognition to pre-merger party control over
right to jury trial. McCoid, Right to Jury Trial in Federal Courts, 45 IowA L. Rxv.
726 (1960). Viewing the request for declaratory relief as legal because it antici-
pated a treble damage claim, I saw the case as having no significant equitable elements.
This may have been sound characterization under the Beacon analysis. See text
accompanying notes 111-18 infra. But it ignored the historical jurisdiction of equity
to act in such cases.2 0 See 3 J. PomRoy, EQUrrY JuRisPRuDENcE §§ 1360-61, 1363 (1883).
21 Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.
1961) ; Curry v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 271 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1959).
2359 U.S. at 509.
23 JAMES § 8.10.
24 The Court referred specifically to the problem of multiplicity. 359 U.S. 506.
25 This rule is unquestionably established by Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469 (1962), discussed at text accompanying notes 32-33 infra, which has been
followed by, e.g., Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, .Textile Workers Union, 350 F.2d
1012 (4th Cir. 1965) ; Harkobusic v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 128
(W.D. Pa. 1962). See also Robine v. Ryan, 310 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1962), where the
rule was partially applied.
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Equity's traditional power to dispose of incidental legal issues in order
to avoid multiplicity of actions 28 becomes a thing of the past.
The logic of the rule might also be extended to reject the result
traditionally reached that, by application of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel in situations requiring both legal and equitable adjudications,
a prior equity decree controlled the determination of the same factual
issues in a subsequent action at law.
Finally, a plaintiff, compelled by a merged procedure to seek both
legal and equitable relief in a single action in order to avoid splitting
his cause of action,28 will be subjected to jury trial on common factual
issues. An illustration is the patent infringement action for an injunc-
tion and treble damages.29
These departures from history are the consequences of a procedural
reform, the merger of law and equity. Eliminating the ancient problem
of multiplicity, this reform obviated the need or justification for bind-
ing nonjury determination in equity of issues common to legal and
equitable relief, and permitted jury determination of such issues in a
single, mixed action.
The language of the Court in Beacon and, indeed, the premises
of the decision strongly presage a broader rejection of historical results.
The Court seems to have concluded that, to the extent plaintiff Fox
sought declaratory relief, its claim contained a legal element, i.e., the
controversy was both legal and equitable even without Beacon's
counterclaim. ° The possible premise was that the declaratory judg-
ment remedy, by permitting an inverted and accelerated adjudication
of Beacon's right to legal relief, was legal, and that its availability
eliminated the necessity for equitable intervention.3 This conclusion
is consistent with the idea that procedural reform in the shape of
merger of law and equity may make legal remedies adequate where
hitherto they have been inadequate. It thus alters the jury trial result
26 See 1 J. PomEoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 181, 243, 245 (1881).
27 E.g., Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899).
28 1B MooRE 0.410[l].
29AMF Tuboscope, Inc. v. Cunningham, 352 F.2d 150 (10th Cir. 1965).
30 Not only does the Court emphasize the significance of the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, 359 U.S. at 506-07, but it also explicitly speaks of jury trial of the plaintiff's
plea for declaratory relief. Id. at 508. The significance of this may not have been
perceived entirely in James v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 349 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (remanding for determination of the adequacy of the legal remedy).
31 The District Courts finding that the Complaint for Declaratory Relief
presented basically equitable issues draws no support from the Declaratory
judgment Act. . . . That statute, while allowing prospective defendants to
sue to establish their nonliability, specifically preserves the right to jury trial
for both parties. It follows that if Beacon would have been entitled to a jury
trial in a treble damage suit against Fox it cannot be deprived of that right
merely because Fox took advantage of the availability of declaratory relief
to sue Beacon first.
359 U.S. at 504.
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reached on the basis of a purely historical inquiry, even where merger
is not a consideration. It cements the view that Beacon requires the
right to jury trial to be measured in the light of procedural reform. And
it opens to inquiry whether other procedural reform may not affect
right to jury trial.
II. Beacon's SUCCESSORS
The Court returned to the problem in 1962 in Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. Wood.32 That decision may be viewed as opposed to my interpreta-
tion of Beacon; actually, however, the decision supports my thesis.
The plaintiff in Dairy Queen, alleging the breach of a written
trademark licensing agreement and infringement of its trademark,
sought an injunction against further use of the mark, an accounting
to determine the amount owing and a judgment for that amount.
The defendant denied any breach and alleged a modification of the
agreement, laches and estoppel grounded on delay in assertion of the
claim and antitrust violations; it also demanded a jury trial.
The district court granted a motion to strike the demand for jury
trial on the ground that the action was purely equitable or, if mixed,
equitable with incidental legal elements.s The Third Circuit denied
mandamus without opinion. Again, the Supreme Court reversed. In
light of Rule 53(b), which provides for reference to a master in jury
actions, the Court rejected the contention that an equitable accounting
was necessary and ruled that defendant was entitled to a jury trial on
the factual issues material thereto, since the plaintiff sought in part
legal relief, i.e., a money judgment.
The argument that the decision is contrary to my reading of
Beacon stems from the Court's attempt to square its decision with
history. Citing Scott v. Neely"4 and Cates v. Allen,35 Mr. Justice
Black, the author of the majority opinion, argued that equity tradi-
tionally lacked jurisdiction where a claim "cognizable only at law is
united in the same pleadings with a claim for equitable relief." "
Professor James has suggested that this is a misreading of history:
that Scott and Cates, unlike Dairy Queen, represent a class of cases
where "equity refused to give relief unless and until a preliminary issue
32369 U.S. 469 (1962).
3 3 McCullough v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
34 140 U.S. 106 (1891). The Court also cited the case in Beacon as forbidding
denial of jury trial in the case of a claim for equitable relief in aid of a legal action
or during its pendency. 359 U.S. at 510.
35149 U.S. 451 (1893).
36 Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 117 (1891), quoted in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood.
369 U.S. 469, 471 (1962).
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had been determined at law by a jury"; 17 and that "[i]n other situa-
tions (probably including that in both Beacon and Dairy Queen)
equity would frequently have tried without a jury the very kinds of
legal issues which were presented in those cases." 38 To this it might
be added that Scott and Cates dealt with changes in state law which,
if applicable, would have contracted, rather than expanded or preserved,
the right to jury trial in the federal courts. 9  Changes in state proce-
dure, even in 1891 and 1893, did not govern the allocation of jurisdic-
tion between law and equity in federal courts where right to jury trial
was at stake.40 Yet whatever the quality of the Court's historical
analysis, its reliance thereon may be asserted in opposition to any broad
interpretation of Beacon.
The Court relied at least equally on the Beacon decision to
support its conclusion that there is a right to jury trial on issues mate-
rial to both legal and equitable relief.4 ' This is a clear application of
the "rule" of Beacon and one that goes beyond the situation of an
equity proceeding designed merely to forestall legal action.42 Moreover,
its characterization of plaintiff's claim for money as legal was based
on the federal rules, which provide for reference to a master in jury
cases, thus eliminating the need for an equitable accounting.' Although
this procedure antedates the federal rules,44 it is a procedural innova-
tion which post-dates 1791.45  Use of that rule to supplant equity
jurisdiction, therefore, is a clear instance, following the Beacon lead,
of definition of the right to jury trial in light of procedural reform.
37 JAMaS § 8.7, at 355.
38 Id. § 8.10, at 374 n.14.
39 Both cases dealt with Mississippi legislation which conferred jurisdiction of
bills by creditors who had not reduced their claims to judgment in state chancery
courts in order to set aside fraudulent conveyances of property. Both decisions held
that, because of the seventh amendment, such state legislation could not enlarge equity
jurisdiction in federal courts at the expense of jurisdiction at law.
40 "Whatever control the State may exercise over proceedings in its own courts,
such a union of legal and equitable relief in the same action is not allowed in the
practice of the Federal Courts." Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 114 (1891).
41369 U.S. at 472-73 (1962).
42 In Dairy Queen plaintiff sought affirmative, coercive relief: an injunction and
a money judgment. Id. at 475.
43 FEn. R. Crv. P. 53(b).
44An order appointing an auditor in an action at law was sustained against a
seventh amendment argument in 1919. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1919).
That case refers to earlier federal use of auditors in cases reaching the Supreme
Court. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Tompkins, 176 U.S. 167 (1900); North Carolina
R.R. v. Swasey, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 405 (1875); Heirs of Dubourg de St. Colombe
v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 625 (1833) ; Field v. Holland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
8 (1810). All of these were equity proceedings, however. The power to appoint an
auditor in an action at law was sustained in Fenno v. Primrose, 119 Fed. 801 (1st
Cir. 1903).
45Ex parte Peterson, supra note 44, at 307-08 (distinguishing the auditor in the
common law action of account, who was appointed after an interlocutory judgment
was rendered in cases where defendant's obligation to plaintiff was as a guardian,
bailiff or receiver of his property).
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The reform involved in Dairy Queen, reference to a master, was of
crucial significance to the very existence of a legal element."0
To these leading cases the Court has added four others: Simler
v. Conner,4' Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Corp.,4" Fitzgerald v. United
States Lines Co.4" and Katchen v. Landy.50
Simler made it clear that federal law governs the right to jury
trial in federal courts,5" but otherwise added nothing. The suit was
for declaratory relief and was regarded by the Court as legal, since it
inverted and accelerated a legal claim for money damages.52 Meeker
involved a request by the plaintiff for both legal and equitable relief.'
The Court reversed the denial of a demanded jury trial, citing Beacon
and Dairy Queen in a per curiam opinion.
In Fitzgerald, a seaman brought an action, based on a single acci-
dent, for negligence, with liability claimed under the Jones Act, and for
unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. Plaintiff demanded a
jury trial on all issues. The trial judge submitted the negligence
and unseaworthiness issues to the jury, but retained for himself the
claim for maintenance and cure. Following the Second Circuit's
affirmance by a divided vote,54 the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded for a jury trial on all three claims. The decision was not
constitutionally grounded; rather it was based on the procedural
desirability of submitting all three, related claims to a single trier of
fact. This seems to mirror the Beacon idea that jury determination
controls issues common to legal and equitable relief; r5 it conceivably
might be used to argue that issues peculiar to equitable relief must be
submitted to a jury which is deciding related factual issues material
to legal, or to legal and equitable relief. On the other hand, the Court's
emphasis on the interrelationship of damages for negligence and main-
tenance and cure 56 may make the case distinctive.
46 Without reference to a master, plaintiff's request for an equitable accounting
would have been justified. On that basis, it might have been questioned whether the
case contained any legal element
47 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
48375 U.S. 160 (1963) (per curiam).
49374 U.S. 16 (1963).
50382 U.S. 23 (1966).
51 That point had been anticipated to some extent by Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Co-op, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).52 A client, admitting his obligation to pay a reasonable fee, sought a declaration
that the contingent fee contract between the parties was the product of the lawyer's
fraud and overreaching and requested an adjudication of the amount owing. Simler
v. Conner, 282 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1960).
53308 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1962).
54 306 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1962).
55 Indeed, Beacon itself pointed out the undesirability of splitting between different
fact-finders determination of considerations relevant to the reasonableness of a restraint
on trade. 359 U.S. at 508 n.10.
56 The same items of damage are to some extent recoverable under the different
counts. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 19 (1963).
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Katchen v. Landy, a bankruptcy case, presented a more difficult
problem. A creditor who had filed claims objected, partly on the ground
of denial of jury trial, to the referee's summary adjudication ordering
payment of allegedly voidable preferences and allowing the claims only
on satisfaction of that judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, as
did the Supreme Court, Justices Black and Douglas dissenting. The
Court left open the applicability of Beacon and Dairy Queen, and
justified the denial of jury trial on the ground that the imperative cir-
cumstances, which Beacon had recognized as justifying nonjury ad-
judication, were to be found in the congressional intent underlying
summary jurisdiction: " "a prompt and effectual administration and
settlement of the estate of all bankrupts within a limited period." "
The Court in Katchen did not elaborate on why Beacon and
Dairy Queen might not apply at all. But such a conclusion would
have to be based on the view that a court exercising bankruptcy juris-
diction is acting entirely in equity. 9 In effect, bankruptcy perpetuates
the division of judicial jurisdiction which otherwise disappeared with
the merger of law and equity. The Court held that bankruptcy juris-
diction included the power to affirmatively avoid preferences in order
to prevent multiplicity of actions, a longstanding justification of equity
power. Given a court with equity powers only, the essential ingredient
of Beacon and Dairy Queen, i.e., legal jurisdiction, is missing.
The conclusion that bankruptcy courts are exclusively equitable
was unnecessary so long as the Court regarded plenary trial of the
trustee's preference claim as seriously disruptive of a principal aim of
bankruptcy. Theoretically, at least, that disruption might well con-
stitute the kind of overriding imperative, frustration of the equitable
remedy, with which the court had qualified the Beacon mandate. 0
That mandate continues untarnished by these cases. What remain for
consideration are inquiries into its soundness and its scope.
III. THE PREMISES OF Beacon
If Beacon is to be read as holding that the grant of a jury trial
is constitutionally compelled, as distinguished from merely permitted
constitutionally, at its core must be the view that the command of
57 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966).
58 Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 311 (1845).
59 The Court itself asserts that proceedings in bankruptcy courts are proceed-
ings in equity. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336-37 (1966). See Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); Barton
v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881).
0 Whether in practice the exercise of summary jurisdiction is so much better
designed to effectuate the congressional intent may be debatable. See W. COLLMI,
BAN RUPTCY 23.12 (14th ed. 1966); 3. MAcLAcELAx, BANKRUPTcY § 194 (1956).
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the seventh amendment is one of adherence to a principle rather than
to a particular set of results. On no other basis can the Court claim
that its decision is faithful to the peculiar "preservation" wording of
that amendment. If right to jury trial is defined in terms of a con-
stant principle, then Beacon only preserves the right.
The abstract view that the right is a matter of principle fits well
with the conception of the Constitution as a durable document providing
continuingly useful standards for an evolving society. The "right of
trial by jury" must be redefined to reflect evolving procedure " in the
same way that our conceptions of "due process" 02 or "unreasonable
searches and seizures" ' have been flexibly defined to meet new
problems. Indeed, this may be especially appropriate in the jury
trial area where, in many instances, particular results had no long-
settled usage in 1791.4
However, the thesis that the seventh amendment compels ad-
herence to a principle is sound only if that principle can be articulated
meaningfully. Without such clear articulation either the command of
the seventh amendment is empty, making right to jury trial a question
of selective inquiry, or the command is necessarily tied entirely to
results reached in 1791, making right to jury trial static. The Beacon
opinion does provide the necessary formulation. It focuses on the
distinction between law and equity jurisdiction. If the issue is legal,
there is a right to jury trial; if equitable, there is no such right. It
must be conceded, of course, that the problem of the constitutional
right to jury trial is broader than this."5 The Court's focus appro-
priately could be only as broad as the problem before it, and that problem
was a product of the law-equity distinction.
The law-equity distinction is a useful basis for a principle distinct
from the historical result test, only insofar as it provides an effective
means of continuing characterization. The Court meets this problem
by suggesting that whether an issue is legal or equitable is determined
61A recent study of the history of the seventh amendment suggests that in 1791
there was no precise meaning and that, in another context-judicial control over the
jury-rational procedural changes have an impact on the nature of jury trial. Hender-
son, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARv. L. REv. 289 (1966).
62 For example, jurisdiction over the person has expanded from the rigid physical
presence and consent theories of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), to the more
flexible minimum contacts test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945). Where constitutional limitations on choice of law once seemed to point to
particular contacts as fixing the choice, Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209
(1922), freer rein is given today. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
63See, e.g., Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
(rejecting the "mere evidence" limitation on searches and seizures).
6 See JAmsxs § 8.2.
65 Admiralty must be considered; historically there was no right to jury trial in
some actions at law.
1967]
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by the nature of the relief to which it is material.6" Damages are
legal; injunctions are equitable. This formulation does not acknowl-
edge explicitly that the remedy sought was not historically the sole
basis of the division between law and equity jurisdiction. Substantive
factors other than remedy 67 were sometimes controlling. The trust,
for example, was a creature of equity. Hence, an action by the bene-
ficiary against the trustee, even for money, normally was consigned to
equity jurisdiction. Beacon, however, does not present a case where
the substantive features control, beyond the fact that treble damages
are recoverable only at law.68 Nor does Beacon touch upon substantive
bases for the allocation of jurisdiction other than remedy.
In addition to the relief requested, procedural factors 69 played
a part in the allocation of jurisdiction.71 Equity sometimes assumed
jurisdiction where the legal remedy was deemed inadequate because
its availability required assertion of a claim by one's adversary."'
Beacon was just such a case. Fox could assert all its defenses in a
treble damage action for antitrust violations brought by Beacon; but
any delay in vindication of its rights threatened irreparable harm.
That threat justified the intervention of equity. More often, perhaps,
equity asumed jurisdiction over matters otherwise legal to avoid
multiple suits.72 Dairy Queen was such a case, if plaintiff's claim for
money is accepted as legal. Two suits would be necessary in a dual
system, if both legal and equitable remedies are to be obtained and
equity had not developed the practice of giving legal relief as an inci-
dent to equitable relief.7
The Beacon Court's principle is directed exactly to those cases
where equity jurisdiction was founded on procedural inadequacies at
law: where the remedy at law is adequate in light of contemporary
procedure, equity lacks jurisdiction, though such jurisdiction might
6 6 Arguably, this suggestion is made explicit only by the dissenting opinion. 359
U.S. 500, 514. However, the majority's early emphasis on the prayer of Fox, id. at
503-04, and the concession at the outset that a claim for injunctive relief is stated,
id. at 506, make clear the significance to the Court of the relief requested.
67I do not believe that it is necessary in this context to characterize remedy gen-
erally as a matter of substance or procedure. I would prefer a process under which
characterization depends on purpose and reflects the fact that the subject of remedies
is material to both in-court and out-of-court conduct. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcom)
OF CONFLICr OF LAws § 122 (Proposed Official Draft, Part I, 1967).
68 The right to jury trial in treble damage cases proceeds from the fact that such
an award is a penalty. Fleitmann v. Welsbach St Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916) ;
Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 23 F.2d 426 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
277 U.S. 594 (1928).
69 See note 66, supra.
7 JAMES § 8.2.
71Id. § 8.9; 3 J. PoMxoY, EQurIY JUSPRUDENCE § 1363 (1883).
72 JAMS §§ 8.2, 8.7, 8.9; 1 3. PoMERoY, supra note 71, at § 243 (1881).
78 Id. § 181.
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have existed under earlier and different procedure. 74 This principle,
which the Court views as commanded by the Seventh Amendment,
as previously noted, is limited in scope. It focuses on right to jury
trial only to the extent that right is affected by allocation of jurisdic-
tion to equity because of procedural obstacles, such as delay or mul-
tiplicity, which make relief on the law side inadequate. It alters the
historical result only as procedural obstacles to an adequate remedy
at law are removed by reform.
It must be granted that acceptance of the premise that the seventh
amendment preserves a principle of allocation of jurisdiction in light
of procedural adequacy, rather than a result determined by procedure no
longer in use, enlarges the scope of jury trial as of right. Objection
to that enlargement proceeds from two quarters: those who believe
that jury trial is inefficient and frequently inadequate for the increas-
ingly complex factual inquiries of contemporary litigation; those who
urge a purely historical test of right to jury trial. The first objection
suggests, as Professor James has noted, an eclectic approach to the
question which more properly belongs to the political than the judicial
arena. 5 While adherents to that policy can be expected to resist
vigorously any enlargement of jury trial, their underlying premise is
irrelevant to determination of the right under existing law.
For courts and lawyers, the second objection, forcefully presented
by the Beacon dissenters, is more serious. This objection to enlarge-
ment emphasizes the preservative language of the seventh amendment
and of the major legislation producing procedural reform. In serious
measure, however, this begs the question. Granted that the stated aim
of the seventh amendment, the Enabling Act " and the Rules,7" as well
as the underlying intent 8 of the Declaratory Judgment Act 79 was to
preserve the right to jury trial, the question remains as to the dimen-
sion of the right preserved. The Beacon decision does no violence to
the preservation concept if the right is defined in terms of a principle
of jurisdiction based on the adequacy of legal procedures.
Advocates of the historical test, however, insist that the right be
defined in terms of the results of 1791, which necessarily include the
74 The principle is clearly perceived, but rejected because of the neutralist approach
to procedural reform, in Note, 47 CALIF. L. Rxv. 760 (1959).
7
5JAM-Fs § 8.11. Illustrative is Railex Corp. v. Joseph Guss & Sons, Inc., 40
F.R.D. 119 (D.D.C. 1966) (jury trial denied in complex patent case, although damages
were sought).
76 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1, 2, 48 Stat. 1064. The current legislation
authorizing rule-making is 28 U.S.C. §2072 (1964).
77 FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
78 See E. BocrAmn, DEcLARAToRY JUDGMENTS 399 (2d ed. 1941) (speaking par-
ticularly, however, of the Uniform Act).
79 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1964).
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procedure of that date. The Beacon dissenters fear that any other
definition will "undermine the basic structure of equity jurisprudence,
developed over the centuries and explicitly recognized in the United
States Constitution." S0 That argument is in part rebutted by Professor
James, who notes overlaps and shifts of jurisdiction, some of them
after ratification of the seventh amendment.8 The "basic structure"
was not as fixed and immutable as the dissenters imply. Moreover,
I hope to show 82 that the threat to equity jurisdiction posed by the
Beacon decision is not so great as may at first appear. Not all reform
of procedure is material to the allocation of jurisdiction. The Beacon
dissenters 83 and James 84 argue that subsequent procedural innovations
have been designed to improve procedure without disturbing the exist-
ing balance between jury and nonjury trial.85 That balance is disturbed
by the Beacon principle; yet if the principle is part of the seventh
amendment, the disturbance must be viewed simply as an inevitable
consequence of reform.
Professor James recognizes that a purely historical test is not
well suited to contemporary united procedure and, at least tentatively,
voices approval of "an elastic construction of the historical test by
the courts in order to accommodate further shifts of the kind and along
the lines of those which were continually taking place in the very period
of history to which the constitutions refer." 86- He registers concern,
however, that a precedent of flexibility may be used by some future
court to curtail jury trial.87 That concern, I believe, is misplaced.
The Court's principle operates only to expand jury trial; it reflects
a strong pro-jury bias. 8 The court's adoption of a principle defining
the right preserved by the seventh amendment in terms of a jurisdic-
tional allocation not frozen by procedures now discarded, is a re-
flection of a bias which is of constitutional origin. 9  The immediate
premise of the Court is that right to jury trial must reflect contem-
80 359 U.S. at 519.
8 1 JAMES § 8.2.
82See text accompanying notes 90-134 infra.
83 359 U.S. at 514-15 (directing their attention to the Declaratory judgment Act).
84 JAMES § 8.10 (speaking more generally).
8 5See Note, 47 CALIF. L. REy. 760, 766-67 (1959).
86 JAMES § 8.3.
87 Id. § 8.10. The flexibility of the Beacon variety does not appear to conform to
the patterns of change, historically evidenced, which he believes should govern. The
seventh amendment protects the right to jury trial; but nowhere in the Constitution
is there a guarantee of a right to nonjury trial.
88 359 U.S. at 510; Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment,
80 HARv. L. Rxv. 289, 291-99 (1966) ; Note, The Right to Nonjury Trial, 74 HARV.
L. REV. 1176 (1961) (advocating a more selective approach where the Constitution
does not require jury trial). The power of Congress to require a jury trial in cases
historically triable to the court seems established. 5 MOORE ff 38.12[1]-[13].
89 Cf. D. LouiSELL AND G. HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 925 (1962) (asking
whether the priority of jury trial assumed by Beacon is based on the Constitution,
policy or personal preference).
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porary procedural reforms permitting greater enjoyment of jury trial.
Underlying that premise, however, is the more fundamental assumption
that jury trial is a desirable form of fact-finding in a democratic
society. Arrived at politically, this assumption is reflected in the con-
stitutional insistence on protection of jury trial.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE Beacon PRINCIPLE
Questions concerning the operative reach of the Beacon principle
are best answered by an examination of whether specific contemporary
procedures effect the requisite procedural reform-i.e., whether the
procedure constitutes a change and whether the change eliminates
the obstacles which had made the legal remedy inadequate. This is
the pattern of analysis suggested by the Court's opinion. It permits us
to identify areas not yet recognized, where the principle probably will
be applied, as well as areas where application is debatable. It also re-
veals areas where the principle will be inoperative. Such an examina-
tion may serve to allay somewhat the fears of Beacon's critics. I do
not intend this examination to be comprehensive; it is designed rather
to elaborate the approach to the problem which I think is proper. At
the same time, it should clarify further the meaning of the Beacon
decision.
A. The Merger of Law and Equity
Much of the complexity of the contemporary problem of right
to jury trial has been ascribed to the merger of law and equity. 0 It
was thus fitting that the Beacon court most clearly pointed to merger as
a reform enlarging the enjoyment of that right.91 Lower courts have
grasped most fully the significance of Beacon in this area. 2 Merger
was thought to create the problem; in reality, it provides a partial
solution.
As specifically authorized by the original Enabling Act, 93 merger
requires the federal courts, which already had jurisdiction at law and
in equity, to exercise both powers in a single action when both legal
and equitable issues are raised.94 This step was not entirely new to
9 oSee note 7 supra.
91359 U.S. at 508, 509, 510 (1959).
92 See note 18 supra.
93 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064 (now 28 U.S.C. § 723 (1964)).
942 MooR f 2.06. The authorization is implemented by the simple language:
"There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action'," FED. R. Civ. P. 2,
coupled with FED. R. Civ. P. I which provides that the Rules govern in all suits
whether cognizable as cases in law, equity or admiralty.
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the federal courts. It had been partially anticipated by Equity Rules
22 and 23, adopted by the Supreme Court in 1912.15
The situations in which merger significantly affects the scope of
jury trial as of right already have been outlined in part. 6  Under
the Beacon principle, merger generally requires jury trial in cases
"[w]here A seeks equitable relief principally to defeat an action at
law by B against him on grounds cognizable as a defense at law, and
where B interposes the law action by way of counterclaim.
This, of course, is the fact situation in Beacon itself. Merger also re-
quires a jury trial where the plaintiff seeks cumulative legal and
equitable relief.9 This was, at least in part, the problem of Dairy
Queen,99 and probably of Beacon itself.' While the principle was
occasionally applied in such cases prior to Beacon,'10 recognition
thereafter is uniform.'
Both situations involve mixed requests for legal and equitable
relief. Right to jury trial on factual issues material to requested legal
relief stems from the fact that merger permits unitary and simultaneous
adjudication at law and in equity. No longer is it necessary to delay
plaintiff's right to adjudication by relegating him to a defense at law
with its possible concomitant, irreparable harm. No longer is it neces-
sary to adjudicate in equity the right to what would otherwise be legal
relief to avoid the burdens of multiple suits, or to bind a litigant by
prior equitable adjudication of factual issues material to legal relief
where formerly two suits were required. In a single proceeding, factual
issues material to legal relief can be decided by a jury, in most cases,
without in any way threatening harm from delay to any litigant.
This same fact about merger is relevant in other cases in which
requests for legal and equitable relief are mixed. One such instance
occurs where equitable relief is a prerequisite to legal relief. Prior
to merger, equity, in order to avoid multiplicity in such cases, fre-
9 5 Rule 22 provided for transfer of actions to the law side if improperly com-
menced in equity. Rule 23 provided for trial, according to legal principles, of legal
issues arising in an equity proceeding. Rules of Practice in Equity, 226 U.S. 654
(1912). Provision also was made for transfer of actions to equity from the law side
if improperly commenced there. Act of March 3, 1915, ch. 90, 38 Stat. 956 (now
28 U.S.C. §§ 379-99 (1964)). These beginnings of merger are described in 2 MooRE
1112.05 [1]-[4].
9GSee text accompanying notes 9-31 supra.
97 JAMEs §§ 8.9-8.10.
98 See cases cited note 25 supra.
99 If plaintiff's claim for money damages was characterized as legal. See text
accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
100 Because plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief was characterized as legal. See
text accompanying note 31 supra.
1'01 E.g., Leimer v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1952) (cited in Beacon).
10 2 See cases cited note 25 supra.
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quently went on to consider plaintiff's right to legal relief after his
right to equitable relief had been established."°3 In such cases, there
was no right to jury trial. Merger permits jury trial on remaining
issues material to the claim for legal relief following an award of
equitable relief, since multiplicity is no longer a problem.0 Merger
probably does not justify granting a jury trial on issues essential to
equitable relief, even if those issues are also material to the legal relief
claimed. Merger permits disposition of the claim for legal relief at
law without a second action; it does not alter the fact that the right
to equitable relief is a substantive prerequisite to legal relief.' 5 In
other words, merger does not mean that issues common to combined
claims for equitable and legal relief in every instance must be tried
to a jury. Merger materially affects the right-to-jury-trial question
only in those cases in which equity jurisdiction originally was based on
procedural grounds.
B. Interpleader
The meaning of Beacon can be clarified by looking at still another
situation where the principle does not apply. The primary develop-
ment of interpleader was in the equity courts of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. From this fact stems the prevailing view that
interpleader is equitable in nature and carries no right to jury trial. 0 6
Interpleader may be viewed merely as a procedure by which com-
peting claimants, whose claims may be legal, can be brought before a
court to protect the interpleading party from the risk of double
103 JA s § 8.7.
104 An example would be an action to reform a contract and to recover damages
on the contract as reformed.
A more difficult problem arises where plaintiff in a single action seeks equitable
or legal relief in the alternative or where, having sought equitable relief which proved
unavailable, he may be entitled to unclaimed legal relief. Since equity historically
might have awarded the legal relief to avoid multiplicity, those faithful to the historical
test have urged reliance on plaintiff's preferred form of relief, as ascertained by rule
of thumb or inquiry, as the basis for the determination. 5 MooRE ff 38.21; McCoid,
Right to Jury Trial in. the Federal Courts, 45 IowA L. REv. 726, 733-34 (1960);
Morris, Jury Trial Under the Fusion of Law and Equity, 20 TEx. L. REv. 427, 432-33
(1942). Believing that this entails expansion of the availability of substituted relief
in equity, James urges jury attendance at the trial, in those cases where the facts
pleaded warrant the possibility that legal relief is obtainable or the only relief available.
JAmEs § 8.7. Beacom makes this mandatory, since merger eliminates the multiplicity
problem which originally justified substituted relief in equity. See General Inv. Co.
v. Ackerman, 37 F.R.D. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (damages an alternative to rescission;
jury trial required).
105 Professor James takes the same position. JAms § 8.7.
1065 MOORE f 38.38[1]; Historical purists may be troubled by the suggestion
that equity borrowed the aevice from the common law. However, the conclusion
reached by Professor Hazard and Mr. Moskovitz in their careful study of interpleader,
that the modern rules of interpleader are derived from equity practice, is satisfactory
for our purpose. Hazard & Moskovitz, An Historical and Critical Analysis of Inter-
pleader, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 706, 709 (1964); accord, Rogers, Historical Origins of
Interpleader, 51 YA.E L.J. 924, 947-50 (1942).
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liability.10 Supporting this view is the fact that the process adds
nothing of substance to the adjudication. The interpleading party is
liable to one, or another, or both or neither claimant, on the same
principles that would have governed had those claimants instituted
separate legal actions against him. Interpleader protects him from
double liability, which might ensue from inconsistent determinations
in separate proceedings.'
If interpleader is merely a procedure, may not the Beacon principle
require jury trial when the claims of the competing claimants are legal?
The defect of this argument is that, while interpleader is a procedural
device, it is not procedural reform. At least, it is not procedural
reform in a relevant sense. Both statutory and Rule 22 interpleader in
the federal courts are three steps away from qualification in that respect.
They free interpleader from some of the limiting conditions 109 that
had grown up around that procedure, but it seems likely that this is
simply a return to the original broader conception of interpleader in
equity."0 Assuming that the elimination of those conditions rises to
the level of reform, it does not change the proper characterization of
interpleader from equitable to legal,"' even though the 1948 Revision
of the Judicial Code 112 has eliminated the explicit characterization of
earlier acts "' and the Rule speaks in neutral terms. The reform is
merely of equity's own procedure, i.e., of the conditions on which the
device may be used.
Finally, procedural reform, in the seventh amendment sense, must
involve something more than the mere verbal transfer of jurisdiction
1o7 Pomeroy noted that the claims might be legal, or legal and equitable or equi-
table; the legal character of one or more of the claims, however, did not detract from
exclusive jurisdiction in equity. 3 POmEROY, EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE § 1321 (1883).
108 Hazard & Moskovitz, .mpra note 106, at 706.
109 Pomeroy listed four essential elements: (1) the same thing, debt or duty
must be claimed by both or all claimants; (2) adverse titles or claims must be de-
pendent or derived from a common source; (3) the plaintiff must not claim any
interest in the subject matter; and (4) the plaintiff must not have incurred inde-
pendent liability to any of the claimants. 3 PomRoy, EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE
§§ 1322-26 (1883). These conditions all are expressed in substantive terms, but they
circumscribe the availability of the procedural device rather than the plaintiff's non-
liability.
110 Hazard & Moskovitz, =rpra note 106, at 707-08. Their work was to some
extent anticipated by Rogers, who found that "privity" and "independent liability,"
requirements attributed to common law interpleader, had no historical foundation.
Rogers, mtpra note 106, at 925.
Ill It simply broadens the utility of the process in equity.
112 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action of inter-
pleader or in the nature of interpleader . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (a) (1964).
(Emphasis added.) Moore states that the change was made for purposes of con-
forming to the language of the Federal Rules. 3 MOORE f 22.06[2], at 3039.
113 The first federal interpleader statute spoke of suits in equity. Act of Feb. 22,
1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929. The amendments of 1925, 1926 and 1936 continued this
allocation of jurisdiction. Act of Feb. 25, 1925, ch. 317, § 1, 43 Stat. 976; Act of
May 8, 1926, ch. 273, § 1, 44 Stat. 416; Act of Jan. 20, 1936, ch. 13, § 1, 49 Stat. 1096.
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from equity to law; more is required than a bare statement that what
could be done in equity can now be done at law. In a system of divided
courts, Congress could confer on law courts the power to use proce-
dures that had previously been available only in equity, thereby enlarg-
ing the right to jury trial under the seventh amendment, since real
change would be involved. In a unitary system, however, neither
Congress nor the Court can alter the dimension of the constitutional
right by such verbalization." 4  Interpleader remains, in my view, an
equity procedure involving no constitutional right to jury trial.
C. Declaratory Judgment
As procedural reform, the declaratory judgment remedy seems
to fall somewhere between merger and interpleader. There is clearly
reform, because the Act permits a declaration of rights in many cases
where previously that had not been possible."" Yet it must be con-
ceded that equity, by use of bills of peace, quia timet, injunctions and
rescission and cancellation, effectively granted relief amounting to a
declaration of rights." 6 In light of previously existing equity juris-
diction, it may be fairly argued that, in cases where that jurisdiction
operated effectively, there is no right to jury trial in declaratory judg-
ment actions today because there was no reform. The change is merely
one of verbalization; it confers a different label on the relief requested." 7
114 Pomeroy states that in England and some American jurisdictions, a summary
form of interpleader was made available by statute in actions at law. 3 PotRoy,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1329 (1883). Had this taken place in the federal system
prior to merger, it might be argued with some force that procedural reform of real
dimension had taken place with a resulting relevance to jury trial as of right under
the Beacon decision. The language of the federal interpleader legislation, note 112
mupra, is to the contrary, however; I have found no evidence of interpleader actions
on the law side of the federal courts prior to 1938. This is not to dispute the power
of Congress to require a jury trial in a proceeding otherwise equitable; but the right
conferred thereby would be statutory rather than constitutional.
115 Borchard suggested that a principal function of the remedy is that it "has
enabled the courts to pass on new types of cases which heretofore predicated adjudi-
cation on prior violence or destruction of the status quo." E. BORcHARD, DECLARATORY
JuDGmENTS 280 (2d ed. 1941); cf. Pittman v. West Am. Ins. Co., 299 F.2d 405 (8th
Cir. 1962).
hOE. BoRcHARa, DECLARATORY JUI)GENTS, pt. 1, ch. IV (2d ed. 1941); JAMEs
§§ 8.8, 8.10. This has led on occasion to the suggestion that "the declaratory judg-
ment and injunctive remedies are equitable in nature." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 155 (1967). See also 47 CALIF. L. REv. 760, 765 (1959). Such sug-
gestions may also stem from the fact that early English development was in Chancery.
See E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 128-29 (2d ed. 1941); Developments in
the Law-Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARv. L. REv. 787, 790 (1949). There is wide
agreement that the roots of the remedy are much deeper, are traceable to the Civil
Law, E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 87-101 (2d ed. 1941), and came to us
from Scotland. Id. at 125-28; Pugh, The Federal Declaratory Remtedy: Justiciability,
Jurisdiction and Related Problems, 6 VAND. L. REv. 79 (1952) (emphasizing that
equity had no concept of the general declaratory action).
l-1 The same argument might be made with regard to merger as a reform elimi-
nating multiplicity, to the extent that equity, by giving incidental legal relief, had
already eliminated that problem. In essence the argument is that reform means change
and that to some extent neither merger nor the declaratory judgment effect real change.
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This argument of "no change" must be distinguished from that
of the dissenters in Beacon and of Professor James. Their argument
is simply that the seventh amendment requires adherence to the results
of 1791. As such, it represents a rejection of the procedural reform
principle, although Professor James acknowledges existence of a
"flexible rather than static rendering of the constitutional test" 118 as a
consequence of Beacon. The no-change argument would concede the
validity of the principle, but deny its application.
The no-change argument clearly has been rejected by the Beacon
majority. Although that rejection was unnecessary, in light of Beacon's
counterclaim which independently justified characterization of the case
as a mixture of claims for legal and equitable relief and brought it
within the reach of merger reform, the rejection was not explained.
It is susceptible of explanation, however.
It has already been noted that, prior to the Declaratory Judgment
Act, immediate adjudication of many legal controversies was impossible.
Equitable remedies were unavailable because an adjudication, when
coercive legal relief was later sought, was believed an adequate remedy.
While declaratory relief remains discretionary, 119 many of those con-
troversies now are subject to immediate adjudication pursuant to the
Act. This acceleration of the time of adjudication clearly is a sig-
nificant procedural reform, a relevant change.' 20  So long as what is
accelerated is adjudication of the right to legal relief, it is a procedural
reform of adjudication at law which requires a right to jury trial. As
merger of law and equity eliminated the problem of multiplicity which
had justified the intervention of equity in matters otherwise legal, so
the declaratory judgment remedy eliminates the problem of delay
which had justified equity intervention in otherwise legal matters.
Unlike interpleader, something has been added to procedure at law
which makes the legal remedy adequate.
The real question is how much has been added. Professor James
has expressed the fear that, under a liberal interpretation of Beacon,
the declaratory judgment remedy may be used as a substitute for
nearly all forms of equitable relief.' 2 ' However, he promptly suggests
that "probably it was meant to be confined to cases where declaratory
relief is sought to forestall a law action." "m With this qualification
I quite agree. With respect to acceleration of adjudication, the declara-
11 8 JAMS § 8.10, at 377.
'1DAbbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 155 (1967); 6A MooRE
57.08[2].
20Id. 57.05; Developments in the Law--Declaratory Judgments, 62 -ARV. L.
REv. 787, 789 (1949).
121 JAMAES § 8.11.
.22 Id.
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tory judgment is a reform, a change of procedure as distinguished from
a verbalization altering only the label. If the declaratory judgment
remedy had been made available only in those cases where equity al-
ready accelerated adjudication, there would be no change, no relevant
reform; the declaratory judgment would be as equitable as interpleader.
Because the acceleration permitted by the remedy is so much broader,
it is a reform which must be regarded as supplanting the more limited
equity jurisdiction. Its aim at procedural reform is much more
analogous to merger which, by providing on a broad scale for the
unitary exercise of legal and equitable power in a single action, com-
prehended a prior exercise of equitable power in matters otherwise
legal.
D. Derivative Actions by Shareholders
The shareholder's derivative suit provides a difficult context in
which to test the application of the Beacon principle. A 1963 decision
in the Ninth Circuit held that there was a constitutional right to jury
trial in such actions where "claims asserted against the corporation are
of a kind which, if asserted by the corporation, would be cognizable
in a suit at common law." 23 The decision seems to be based on the
view that such an action is a composite of equitable and legal claims,
i.e., the shareholder's claim against the corporation which is equitable
because based on breach of trust, and the corporation's claim against
a third party which is legal."' On this basis it can be argued that
merger eliminates the necessity of equity adjudication of the latter claim.
The decision has been criticized 125 on the ground that Beacon
speaks only to civil actions which were historically separable into
suits at law and in equity, while the shareholder's suit is historically
unitary. 26 The criticism emphasizes the trust relationship between
management and shareholder and suggests that the dual analysis of
the court is necessary only when the shareholder enforces corporate
rights against an outsider. Even there, however, the critic apparently
relies on equity's historically exclusive jurisdiction. 127 While his read-
ing of Beacon is too narrow, it does make the telling point that equity
jurisdiction over derivative suits against corporate insiders is based
1= DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 837 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964); cf. Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297
(3d Cir. 1962).
124 323 F.2d at 836. The relevant third parties were directors of the corporation.
2 Note, 74 YALE L.J. 725 (1965).
126 Id. at 737.
=
2 7 Id. at 730-32.
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on subject matter rather than procedure.' It does not justify, how-
ever, denial of a jury trial on issues material to the corporate claim
against outsiders, since, in that type of derivative suit, equity jurisdic-
tion over the corporate claim might be grounded on the multiplicity
problem which was eliminated by merger.
In his study of the history of the derivative suit, Professor Prunty
notes the importance to equity jurisdiction, both in England and
America, of the trust relationship.' 29 He also emphasizes the represen-
tative nature of the proceeding, though the representation is of the
other shareholders rather than of the corporation.' Nevertheless,
that representative factor might serve as a basis for denial of jury trial,
if it justified characterization of the whole of derivative proceedings
as equitable. Certainly the representative action, regardless of the
remedy sought, was historically equitable, not only because of the rigid
joinder rules of common law, but also because of the need for judicial
protection of the represented absentees.' 1 To the argument that
representation is merely a joinder device " which might be adopted
by the law courts like other joinder tools of equity, it might be answered
that, in a unitary system, any so-called adoption, unless it permits pre-
viously unavailable procedure, is mere verbalization and not reform
of procedure at all. No real change of procedure is involved in con-
temporary legislation governing derivative suits.
If there is a difficulty with this argument, it lies in the fact that
representative actions were entertained on the law side of the federal
courts prior to merger.8 3  Thus, there may have been pre-merger
12 8 The Ninth Circuit may have been seeking to avoid that difficulty when it
suggested that, because the liability of the insiders rested on a finding of gross negli-
gence which is actionable at common law, there was a right to jury trial. DePinto
v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 837 (9th Cir. 1963). It was unnecessary,
therefore, to determine whether the judgment could be rested on breach of fiduciary
duty which might be cognizable only in equity. Id. at 837 n.24.
129 Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 980, 981 (1957).
130 Id. at 984, 989.
1312 W. BARRON & A. HOLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 561
(Wright ed. 1961); Z. CHAFFE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 211-12 (1950); 3 MOORE
[ 23.02.
132 Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 211-12 (1950).
133 Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle, 221 F. 590 (6th Cir. 1915),
cert. denied, 241 U.S. 670 (1916); Penny v. Central Coal and Coke Co., 138 F.
769 (8th Cir. 1905). Pursuant to the Conformity Act, both cases rely on state legis-
lation authorizing class suits. The cited state legislation, however, appeared in codes
that merged law and equity into a single system (Arkansas in 1868, Kentucky in
1851) as do the Federal Rules. While prior to the Rules, procedure in law actions
in the federal courts corresponded to state procedure under the Conformity Act, there
was authority rejecting use of state practice which blurred law and equity. See A.
DOME, FEDERAL JURIsDICTION AND PROCEDURE § 147 (1928). In neither suit, appar-
ently, was the matter argued in terms of right to jury trial or that the proceeding
should have been in equity.
Moore, relying on the original 1937 committee note to Rule 23, argues that it
was intended to make this joinder device applicable to all actions, whether previously
legal or equitable. 5 MOORE 38.38[2]. Robinson v. Brown, 320 F.2d 503 (6th Cir.
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reform of procedure at law. Those actions, however, were class actions,
rather than shareholder derivative suits. In spite of the relationship
between the two, it may be argued that there is no evidence of adoption
by law courts of the representation device in the derivative suit area.3 4
Moreover, use at law of the representation procedure in class suits
had not been validated by the Supreme Court at the time of merger.
After merger, any adoption by law courts of an equity procedure with-
out more would be a mere change of label without any real reform of
procedure. The only significance would be alteration of right to jury
trial. This is not procedural reform within the meaning of the
Beacon principle.
V. CONCLUSION
Examination of merger, interpleader, the declaratory judgment
and the shareholder's derivative suit illustrates that determining whether
a particular procedural device embodies reform going beyond the mere
changing of labels requires an individualized, and sometimes complex,
inquiry. Yet it is an inquiry required by the Supreme Court's decision
in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover. That decision requires a
determination whether previous inadequacy of a legal remedy, which
hitherto justified the exercise of equity jurisdiction, has been cured by
changes of procedure. The scope of seventh amendment protection
of right to jury trial has always been largely a question of the juris-
dictional lines between law on the one hand, and equity and admiralty
on the other. Beacon does not alter the view that the inquiry is juris-
dictional. It does assert, however, that the seventh amendment's
protection is based on a jurisdictional principle, rather than a conglom-
1963), denied a jury trial in a class suit where the plaintiff sought only equitable
relief and there were no facts in dispute. The question remains whether any real
change was effected, although a statutory right to jury trial might be created, in any
event, if that was intended.
13 4 See Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522
(1947). The derivative action was the subject of Equity Rule 94, Additional Rule
of Practice in Equity, 104 U.S. ix (1882), repromulgated as Equity Rule 27, Rules of
Practice in Equity, 226 U.S. 656 (1912). The class action was also made the subject
of a rule. Equity Rule 38, id. at 659.
In Richland v. Crandall, 259 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), jury trial was
allowed in a derivative action because it was alternatively a class action for damages
under the Securities Exchange Act; but the trial court took the firm position that
the seventh amendment does not guarantee jury trial in a derivative action. DePinto
v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
950 (1964), was rejected on the ground that right to jury trial belongs to the corpo-
ration which sues the outsider at law, and not to the stockholder who sues derivatively.
Rejection of DePinto seems based on the unitary view of the derivative suit. The
unitary view may stem simply from the already developed concept that equity could
assert jurisdiction over matters otherwise purely legal, to avoid multiplicity. If the
representative feature has continuing significance, the corporation's claim against the
outsider is not "otherwise legal" where asserted by the shareholder.
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eration of jurisdictional results dictated by discarded procedures;
jurisdiction is determined in light of existing, not past, procedure.
The consequences of such a "principle approach" are probably
not as far-reaching as the critics of Beacon fear. Many current prac-
tices do not involve any change of jurisdiction. Other changes are
less extensive in any real sense than might be thought, for change re-
quires more than label alteration- One change, merger, while clearly
contracting equity jurisdiction to some degree, itself makes unnecessary
many further changes. The pattern of procedures once equitable gradu-
ally being taken over at law is a familiar one. Prior to merger those
changes were substantial; in a unitary system such shifts are conceptual
and, as such, are not within the Beacon principle.
The Beacon decision, however, clearly enlarges enjoyment of
jury trial as of right and reflects a basic pro-jury bias. That it should
do so is quite clear, in view of the pro-jury bias of the Constitution.
